Extended Executive Summary November 2018
Impacts of the Rohingya Refugee Influx on Host Communities Extended Executive Summary
November 2018
United Nations Development Programme UN Offices, 18th Floor, IDB Bhaban Agargaon, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar Dhaka 1207, Bangladesh
www.bd.undp.org
Standard Disclaimer:
This report is a product of the UNDP Bangladesh Country Office. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Board of the UNDP or the governments they represent. UNDP does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of UNDP concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Copyright Statement:
Copyright Š United Nations Development Programme, Bangladesh Country Office UN Offices, 18th Floor, IDB Bhaban, Agargaon, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka 1207, Bangladesh
Acknowledgement
This is an Extended Executive Summary of the integrated report of three thematic studies on the Impact of the Rohingya refugee Influx on Host Communities, which UNDP commissioned to Policy Research Institute (PRI). UNDP duly acknowledges the contribution made by PRI research team. which includes: (1) Socioeconomic Impacts of the Rohingya Refugee Influx on Host Communities Dr. M. Abdur Razzaque, Reseach Director PRI, Team Leader Dr. M. Abu Eusuf, Team Member Mr. Mahtab Uddin, Team Member Mr. Jillur Rahman, Team Member Mr. Hamim Akib, Team Member (2) Impacts on Public Service and Public Goods Delivery of the Rohingya Refugee Influx in Host Communities Dr. Zaidi Sattar, Chairman PRI (3) Impacts on Social Safety Nets of the Rohingya Refugee Influx in Host Communities Dr. Bazlul H Khondker, Director PRI Ms. Roo Griffith provided editorial services. UNDP also acknowledges generous support from Cox’s Bazar District Administration Office and UNDP Sub-Office in Cox’s Bazar. The entire research project was led by Shamsur Rahman, National Economic Advisor, UNDP Bangladesh. Muhammad Moshiur Rahman, Reseach Associate, provided substantial inputs and acted as the Assistant Task Manger.
Executive summary The massive influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, fleeing a campaign of violence and terror by the Myanmar military, has had a profound impact on the local communities of Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban districts. At one point, the exodus unfolded as one of the fastest-growing refugee crises in history. According to Huang et al. (2018), Bangladesh received more refugees in the first three weeks of the influx (in August 2017) than all of Europe received in 2016 during the Syrian crisis. With less than 0.31 per cent of the earth’s population, Bangladesh hosts 4.7 per cent of its total refugees.
Bangladesh received more refugees in the first three weeks of the influx than all of Europe received in 2016 during the Syrian crisis.
4
GDP per capita (US$ '000)
60
3.5
50
3
40
2.5 2
30
1.5
20
1
10
0.5
0 Turkey Pakistan Uganda Lebanon Iran Germany Bangladesh Sudan Ethiopia Jordan Congo Kenya Chad Cameroon France China Tanzania United States Iraq Sweden Egypt India Rwanda Italy Niger Russia United Kingdom Austria Canada Thailand Netherlands Malaysia
0
Source: UNDP estimates based on UNHCR (2018) and World Development Indicators 2018.
4
Number of refugees (million)
Figure ES.1. Refugee numbers and host country GDP per capita
Cox’s Bazar, an administrative district within Chattogram division, has been the primary settlement location for an overwhelming majority of the fleeing Rohingya. The two southern Cox’s Bazar upazilas— Teknaf and Ukhiya—have borne the brunt of this crisis. At present, refugees constitute more than a third of the local population; in Ukhiya, the number of refugees (761,059) is more than three times the host population of 241,100 (IOM, 2018). It is no longer sufficient simply to address the needs of the Rohingya. Rising prices of necessities and falling wages of low-skilled workers are adversely affecting host community populations. There are also huge concerns about environmental degradation, excessive pressure on already weak physical infrastructure and public services and mounting tensions among refugees and host communities. This study uses systematic evidence drawn from a household survey undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) during April–May 2018 in Cox’s Bazar. It uses the results of this to assess the impacts of the refugee influx on the host community in socio-economic, public service delivery and social safety net terms. The aim is to help enable stakeholders to identify areas of support and strengthen existing service provision for both refugees and the local population.
5
Methodology
In looking into socio-economic impacts, this study utilizes an approach comparable with that of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) to assess incidence of nationwide poverty. This is based on a poverty line income generated using established practices on poverty estimation, then identification of households that fall below this. We assess changes in prices and wages to isolate impacts on host community household income and poverty status arising solely as a result of the refugee influx. Further, we explore links among Rohingya camp and host community economies, simulating various refugee influx-related consequences and thereby assessing their overall macro-economic impact. We used a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) model looking at three economies—Cox’s Bazar, Rohingya and the rest of Bangladesh—to assess the macroeconomic impact at community level. On public service delivery, we use a mix of the primary survey data, secondary data from traditional institutional sources and occasionally perceptions based on the researchers’ understanding. Key Government of Bangladesh (GoB) agencies engaged in the provision of services to the Rohingya and the host population are identified and their current personnel strength assessed. For the impacts on social safety nets, we use our SAM model to generate three potential schemes to compensate for the net negative impact on the host community of the refugee influx. We also identify the resource requirements for generating employment for Rohingya adults. We used both quantitative and qualitative tools to gather data and information on community perceptions in order to be able to assess the impacts, as well as secondary sources. 6
The chief quantitative instrument was a micro survey administered among households in Teknaf and Ukhiya upazilas, selected using a stratified multi-stage sampling framework. We also conducted a brief survey to understand refugee interactions with the host community, covering 75 Rohingya households in Kutupalong camp, in Ukhiya upazila. We enquired about incomes in cash and in kind, other incomeearning activities and recent purchases from either the shops in the camps or outside. This study also makes use of qualitative information collected during focus group discussions (FGDs) and consultations with development partners, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and GOB in Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar. In terms of secondary sources, we rely particularly on the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) of 2013 and 2016–2017 and the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) of 2010 and 2016. The review of social protection is based on administrative data published by the Ministry of Finance and the HIES 2010. We use data from the Cox’s Bazar Department of Social Services (DSS) to analyse key features of the local system and the consequences of the influx on this. We use UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) Needs and Population Monitoring (NPM) data to identify the resource requirement for generating employment for Rohingya adults. Limitations included time and resource constraints, limited or weak secondary data, issues related to evolving conditions, the reliance on “recall” in primary data asserting sampling response biases, etc.
The two districts pre-influx Land and resources More than 60 per cent of the land in Cox’s Bazar district is either forest or unavailable for cultivation, in comparison with 40 per cent for the country as a whole (BBS, 2017a). Teknaf and Ukhiya have a relatively smaller land area and a greater share of reserved forest (Teknaf 41 percent; Ukhiya 59 per cent). Bandarban, with an area of 4,479.01 km2, is a hilly district, with very little land area suitable for cultivation—only about 6 per cent of the total. Figure ES.2. Uses of land, Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar districts, Chattogram division and Bangladesh 2015–2016 (%) Bangladesh Chattogram Cox's Bazar Bandarban 0% Forest area
10%
20%
Not available for cultivation
30% Cultivable waste area
40% Current fallow area
50% Single cropped area
60%
70%
Double cropped area
80% Triple cropped area
90%
100%
Quardruple cropped area
Source: Estimates from BBS data (2017a). 7
Demographics
The population growth rate in Cox’s Bazar is almost double the national average, at 2.55 per cent as against 1.47 per cent. Teknaf and Ukhiya have populations of about 0.31 million and 0.24 million, respectively. Both the upazilas have a relatively large proportion of children and young adults. Bandarban has a total population of about half a million and is one of the least populated districts in Bangladesh in terms of population density.
8
Labour market Labour force participation in Cox’s Bazar as a whole is estimated to be 54.8 per cent, about 3.4 percentage points lower than the national average of 58.2 per cent. However, the rates in Teknaf and Ukhiya are a little higher than the district and national averages (BBS, 2018). Figure ES.3. Labour force participation rates, Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar districts (%) 90 80
Bandarban, 68.29
70
%
60 50
Chattogram, 54.51
Cox's Bazar, 54.77
Jhalokati, 33.52
Bandarban, 56.64
40 30
Chattogram, 31.06 Cox's Bazar, 25.95
20 10 0
LFPR
Female LFPR
Source: Estimates from BBS data (2018). The female rate in Cox’s Bazar is almost 10 percentage points lower than the national average of 36.3 per cent (BBS, 2018). The female rate in Teknaf is lower than both the national and the district average but Ukhiya’s is close to the national average. Lack of education and training, prevalence of early marriage and patriarchal social norms are some of the factors contributing to women’s limited labour market participation. Figure ES.4. Labour force participation rate, Teknaf and Ukhiya upazilas, Cox’s Bazar district and Bangladesh (%) 70 60
%
50 40 30 20 10 0
Teknaf
Ukhiya LFPR
Cox's Bazar
Bangladesh
Female LFPR
Source: Estimates from BBS data (2018). 9
Bandarban has both overall and female LFPRs that are higher than the corresponding national averages (BBS, 2018).
Occupation and employment
Agriculture is the primary source of livelihoods, and rice is the main agricultural crop in the district. Other major agricultural production activities in Cox’s Bazar involve betel nuts, betel leaf and coconut. With limited cultivable land, Bandarban produces few crops and fruits. Fishing is another critical source of livelihood, with the total number of registered fishers at 45,878.1 Teknaf’s dependence on agriculture is at a staggering 81 per cent, while the corresponding figure for Ukhiya is 63 per cent. Compared with Bangladesh overall and Cox’s Bazar district, both Teknaf and Ukhiya have much lower industrial employment (which includes manufacturing).
1
10
Statistics provided by Cox’s Bazar Fisheries Office.
Figure ES.5. Employment by economic sector, Teknaf and Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban, Chattogram and Bangladesh (%) 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
Agriculture
40%
Industry
30%
Services
20% 10% 0%
Bangladesh Cox's Bazar Bandarban Chattogram
Teknaf
Ukhiya
Source: Estimates from BBS data (2018). And yet, intensity of cropping is below the national average: Bandarban is at about 139 per cent while the national average is 194 per cent (Cox’s Bazar is at 177 per cent).2 In fact, Bandarban has the smallest net cropped area of all districts in Bangladesh (BBS, 2017a). Reasons for this include issues related to soil salinity and scarcity of surface and groundwater resources for irrigation. Figure ES.6. Intensity of cropping, Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar districts, Chattogram division and Bangladesh (%)
Bangladesh
138.8%
Chattogram
176.8%
Cox's Bazar
186.4%
Bandarban
194.3% 0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
Source: Estimates from BBS data (2013a). 2
Intensity of cropping is calculated as (gross cropped area/net cropped area)*100
11
Income and consumption
Wages in Cox’s Bazar, at about Tk. 11,317 per month, are just below the national average. This is nearly a third less than wages in Dhaka, and Cox’s Bazar ranks 49th out of 64 districts in this regard (Figure ES.7). This probably reflects the lack of industrial jobs and possibly of rural non-farm employment opportunities. Figure ES.7. Ranking of districts by per capita income, 2016 (US$) 5,000
Narayanganj, $4,580
4,500 Per capita GDP (US$)
4,000
Gazipur, $3,483
3,500
Chattogram, $2,996
3,000
Dhaka, $2,824
2,500 2,000
Bandarban, $290
1,500
Satkhira, $291
1,000
Cox's Bazar, $534
Khulna, $1,120
500 0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Source: Estimates from World Bank using nightlight intensity data. Per capita income and consumption in Cox’s Bazar are comparable with the national averages. Bandarban’s per capita income and consumption are much lower than those of Cox’s Bazar and the national average (BBS, 2017a). 12
Health and education
Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban are characterized by high prevalence of stunting and moderate and severe underweight prevalence among children: moderate and severe stunting is 7 percentage points higher than the national average of 42 per cent. Similar differences are seen between Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban and the national average on moderate and severe underweight. Moderate acute malnutrition rates are for Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban, respectively, 10.1 per cent and 12.9 per cent—higher than the national average of 9.6 per cent. Severe acute malnutrition is 3 per cent in Cox’s Bazar and 4 per cent in Bandarban; the national average is 1.6 per cent (BBS, 2015). Poor performance on such indicators is caused by food shortage, food insecurity and unplanned pregnancy. Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban also lag behind most other districts on educational attainment. The adult literacy rate in Cox’s Bazar is 58 per cent, against the national average of 69 per cent (BBS, 2018). Teknaf and Ukhiya perform even worse: LFS 2016–2017 data show literacy rates in these two upazilas are 36.9 per cent and 45.4 per cent, respectively (ibid.). The female literacy rate in both Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar districts and both Teknaf and Ukhiya upazilas is lower than that of males: Bandarban shows 60% versus 47%, Cox’s Bazar 62% versus 53%, Teknaf 43% versus 29% and Ukhiya 51% versus 40%.
13
Infrastructure and sanitation
Electricity connectivity in Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban is far below the national average. For Teknaf and Ukhiya, the figures are around 60 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively, compared with 82.5 per cent for the population as a whole (BBS, 2018). As many as 92 per cent of households in Cox’s Bazar and 84 per cent in Bandarban rely primarily on firewood for cooking. This compares with 44 per cent for Bangladesh overall (ibid.). Apart from in Chakaria, dirt roads dominate the transportation network in all upazilas in Cox’s Bazar. While 98 per cent of the population as a whole has access to safe drinking water, the figure is only 45 per cent in Bandarban. Improved and unshared sanitary latrines are used by 56 per cent of households in Bangladesh; the figure is 52 per cent in Cox’s Bazar but only 18 per cent in Bandarban. Similarly, while 39 per cent of Bangladeshi households practise safe disposal of child faeces, in Cox’s Bazar the figure is 12 per cent and in Bandarban it is slightly less than 5 per cent (BBS, 2015).
Headcount poverty According to the latest poverty estimates, in the HIES (BBS, 2017b), 24.3 per cent of the Bangladeshi population lives in poverty. The same source states that headcount poverty incidence in Cox’s Bazar is 16.6 per cent. Using the BBS data, we can calculate the headcount poverty rates for Teknaf and Ukhiya at 42 per cent and 4.8 per cent, respectively. It is striking that Ukhiya has such low incidence of poverty.3 The headcount poverty rate in Bandarban is as high as 63 per cent.
3 There is no discussion in the BBS report on local-level poverty incidence. Studies on the refugee-affected areas seem to suggest much higher levels of poverty and vulnerability.
14
Figure ES.8. Headcount poverty, Teknaf and Ukhiya, Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar, Chattogram and Bangladesh (%) 70
63.04
60 50
41.97
40 30
24.24 16.58
20
13.69
10 0
4.81 Bangladesh
Cox's Bazar
Bandarban
Teknaf
Ukhiya
Source: Estimates from BBS data (2017c). Social protection Several social protection schemes are being implemented in Cox’s Bazar as part of the government’s social safety net programmes. These include an old age allowance, vulnerable group feeding, vulnerable group development, allowances for widows, stipends for transgender and other marginalized groups, allowances for lactating mothers, interest-free loans for the disabled and rural social services. In all, there were 13,754 programme beneficiaries in Teknaf in 2017/18, costing Tk. 68 million. For Ukhiya, the number of beneficiaries was 10,981 at a cost of Tk. 46 million.4
Context: the Rohingya influx, GOB response and institutional set-up Rohingya demographics There have been three main waves of Rohingya refugee influx from Rakhine state into Cox’sBazar district since 1978, with the wave arriving in 2017 influx the largest. Following each previous influx, some Rohingya refugees were repatriated, at the initiative of GOB, but a sizeable number remained in Bangladesh. These refugees are mostly accommodated in two major refugee settlements—Kutupalong and Nayapara in Ukhiya upazila—which have existed since the 1990s.
4
Statistics from DSS and Department of Social Welfare. The cost figures include allowances and total disbursed loans.
15
The latest influx of Rohingya has turned into one of the fastest-growing refugee crises in the world.
The total refugee population is estimated at 882,676, or 203,137 families. A total of 52 per cent are female and 48 per cent are male. Children make up more than half, at 55 per cent; adults and the elderly constitute 42 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. Figure ES.9. Refugee population in Teknaf and Ukhiya as of 21 June 2018 (rounded)
Source: ISCG (2018a).
16
Table ES.1. Ratios of refugees to host communities, Ukhiya and Teknaf Bangladeshi population
Ukhiya
198,099
Teknaf
366,979
Total for 2 upazilas
565,078
Rohingya refugees
Rohingya refugees with host communities
737,854 740,770 (total) 166,202 171,532 (total) 904,056
% refugees vs. host population
2,920
374
5,332
47 161
912,302 (total)
Source: BBS (2017b) and ISCG (2018a).
Bangladesh government policy on the Rohingya and response
GoB, with the support of the international community, organized temporary settlement of the refugees. However, it quickly became clear Bangladesh alone could not meet the demands arising out of this huge refugee influx. The international community has responded to the crisis positively, mostly through various UN and other multilateral agencies and NGOs, both local and international. Current GoB policy with regard to Rohingya refugees is to repatriate them subject to congenial atmosphere is created in Rakhine so that the refuges are safe, and can live with dignity. In the wake of the 2017 refugee influx, in November, representatives of GoB and the Government of Myanmar held several rounds of meetings, and a draft repatriation document has reportedly been signed (not in the public domain). At this point in time, though, there is no clear indication as to what agreement has been reached on how repatriation will take place. The UN and other international agencies have opined that, unless the safety and security of the returning Rohingya are guaranteed under the auspices of an international body (e.g. the UN), repatriation should not take place. There is a strong belief that repatriation may take a very long time, and many refugees may not be repatriated at all.
17
Organizational framework for the refugee crisis management
The Cox’s Bazar District Administration bore most of the emergency operation. In November 2017, the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) was entrusted with overseeing all aspects of refugee settlement and management. Headquartered in Cox’s Bazar, RRRC collaborates with the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) (led by IOM and UNHCR) in the district and the Strategic Executive Group of UN agencies in Dhaka, including in public service delivery and overall welfare. The humanitarian community, led by ISCG and the Strategic Executive Group of UN agencies, worked closely with GOB to draw up its Joint Response Plan (JRP) for 2018 (March–December) (ISCG, 2018a). This lays out a vision for a coordinated response to address the immediate needs of the refugees and mitigate the impacts on affected host communities. The JRP also covers strengthening government institutions and systems and provides support to RRRC and local authorities in Teknaf and Ukhiya.
18
Figure ES.10. JRP funding requirements by sector (US$ million) Food security WASH Shelter Site management Health Protection Nutrition Education Communication with communities Coordination Logistics Emergency telecommuncations
5.9 5.6 3.7 1.2 0
71.8 56.8 47.4
50
100
240.9
136.7 136.6 131.5 113.1
150
200
Total requirement US$950.8 million
250
300
Source: Estimates from ISCG data (2018a). GoB and ISCG are now focusing on a medium- to long-term response as the likelihood of immediate repatriation for the refugees has become increasingly uncertain. Building on the immediate crisis response as outlined in the JRP, the Rapid Impact, Vulnerability and Needs Assessment (RIVNA) takes a much longer perspective (World Bank, 2018). This encompasses interventions to build resilient communities, extending to two years beyond the early recovery period. It estimates that more than US$1.15 billion will be required to meet the needs of displaced Rohingya and host communities. Effective coordination between the Deputy Commissioner’s Office and RRRC is critical to the smooth operation of the camps. The DC Office remains critical, in that the central government communicates/ implements major instructions relating to the Rohingya through it. In addition, its Executive Magistrates are the only officers with magisterial authority to conduct mobile courts for adjudication in cases of offences committed by refugees or disputes between refugees and local people. Other administrative responsibilities devolved to the District Administration include monitoring humanitarian assistance and clearing private donations of food and other goods.
19
Socio-economic impacts on host communities Microeconomic impacts
Impact on prices: Our survey data show mixed trends in terms of price movements. At the time of our fieldwork (May–June 2018), it was common knowledge that refugees were selling large quantities of certain in-kind assistance received as relief items. Local shopkeepers reported depressed prices of products that were leaking out of the camps to be sold in the local market at much lower than market price. Changes in prices can vary for many reasons unrelated to their relationship to higher demand owing to the refugee influx. It must be pointed out that the country saw a massive price hike in rice in the aftermath of three episodes of flooding in 2017 (Parvez, 2018). Rice imports increased sharply during July–December 2017, yet prices remained at a much higher level. However, it is reasonable to consider that rice prices in the refugee-affected areas have been considerably depressed as a result of leakages from the camps. When measured against price trends at the national level, the depressed price level in the refugee-affected areas becomes even clearer. The survey found rice prices in Teknaf and Ukhiya post-influx to be Tk. 38 per kg during May– June 2018, lower on average than the national price by Tk. 6 per kg (Tk. 44 in April 2018). Refugees’ purchases of other products, on the other hand, push prices up. The net effect demonstrated by the survey suggests slightly decreased price pressures on the food products considered most relevant to the poor. Impact on wages: Meanwhile, our survey confirmed depressed wages for agricultural and other unskilled workers. The reason given was that the Rohingya were working as day labourers at a lower wage rate near their camps. The survey data show that the mean wages of all labourers, as reported by households, declined from Tk. 417 pre-influx to Tk. 357 post-influx, which means that, post-influx, wages have fallen by more than 14 per cent in Teknaf. The figure for Ukhiya is about 6 per cent. However, agricultural wages in Ukhiya have fallen by a much higher rate. The mean agricultural wage rate in Teknaf has fallen by 11 per cent in the 20
post-influx period; the figure for Ukhiya is 17 per cent. Mean wages in the rest of Cox’s Bazar have increased by more than 4 per cent for all wage labourers and 6.7 per cent for agricultural wage workers. One plausible explanation for this contrasting finding is that the Rohingya are mostly working close to their camp area (in Teknaf and Ukhiya). Since the survey found wages in the rest of Cox’s Bazar district had actually risen by 6.7 per cent, it is estimated that the influx has depressed wages in Teknaf and Ukhiya by on average 20 per cent. Figure ES.11. Wage impacts in June 2018 (% change over pre-crisis period) 10
6.7 4.2
5
% change
0
Teknaf
Ukhiya
-5
-15
All wage labourers Agricultural wage labourers
-6.1
-10
Rest of Cox's Bazar
-11.3 -14.3
-20
-17.4
Source: UNDP household survey 2018. Impacts of price changes alone on poverty: In order to capture the effects of price changes on poverty as a result of the Rohingya influx, we constructed a poverty line that takes into consideration the depressed prices of rice, lentils and cooking oils and the increased prices of vegetables and other commodities. The price-adjusted poverty line income is higher than the post-influx poverty line. The difference in the poverty incidence estimates using the two poverty lines can be considered as the net effect of price changes as a result of the Rohingya crisis. The estimated poverty census rate using the price-adjusted poverty line remains unchanged. That is, in our sample there are no households that fall between the post-influx and price-adjusted poverty lines. The relatively small difference between the two poverty lines is the obvious reason for this.5 Impacts of wage changes alone on poverty: We capture the impact of wage changes on poverty by compensating the relevant households for the loss of income as a result of falling daily wage rates. This compensation is equivalent to the average fall in daily wages in Teknaf and Ukhiya plus the average increase in wages in the rest of Cox’s Bazar. This is tantamount to an assumption that, in the absence of the Rohingya influx, wages in Teknaf and Ukhiya would have risen by the same amount as in other part of Cox’s Bazar district. 5
Prices for certain items fell as a result of the influx, whereas prices for others rose. As such, the net effect has been small.
21
The estimates show that, because of declining wages, headcount poverty rates in Teknaf and Ukhiya have increased by 2.73 and 2.63 percentage points, respectively. That is, if there were no impact on wages, headcount poverty in Teknaf would be 21.82 per cent instead of 24.5 per cent. In Ukhiya, poverty incidence would have fallen to 25.8 per cent from 28.5 per cent if there had been no impact on wages. Declining wages have resulted in poverty gap ratios rising by 1.9 and 1.4 percentage points in Teknaf and Ukhiya, respectively. Figure ES.12. Effects of wage changes on headcount poverty (left) and poverty gap ratio (right) (%) 30 20
21.82
24.55
25.87
28.5
5
Teknaf
9.11
10
10 0
15
Ukhiya
Headcount poverty (after compensating for falling wages)
3.48
0
10.05
5.40
Teknaf
Ukhiya
Poverty gap ratio (after compensating for falling wages)
Source: Estimated using data from UNDP household survey 2018. Combined impacts of wages and prices on poverty: The combined effects of changes in wages and prices should provide the net impact of refugees on the host community’s incidence of poverty. The estimated net effects show headcount poverty has increased by 2.73 percentage points in Teknaf and 2.63 percentage points in Ukhiya. Since there is no price impact for headcount poverty, the wage impact alone contributes to the net effect. Figure ES.13 shows the poverty gap ratios from the combined effects. Falling wages lead to a rise in the poverty gap by 1.93 and 0.93 percentage points, respectively, in Teknaf and Ukhiya. On the other hand, depressed prices help reduce the poverty gap by 0.47 and 0.46 percentage points, respectively. Therefore, the net change in the poverty gap ratio is estimated to be 1.47 percentage points for Teknaf and 0.52 percentage points for Ukhiya.
22
Figure ES.13. Effect of wages and prices on the poverty gap ratio (%) 2.5 2.0
1.93 1.47
1.5
0.93
%
1.0
0.52
0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0
-0.47
-0.46
Teknaf
Ukhiya
Source: UNDP household survey 2018.
Impacts on vulnerability
Some households that are not currently impoverished may be regarded as “vulnerable� in the sense that relatively minor shocks could push them below the poverty line. Following the National Social Security Strategy (NSSS), we defined the standard measure of vulnerability by raising the upper poverty line (UPL) with a 25 per cent adjustment factor (i.e. UPL * 1.25). An extended definition was adopted by raising the UPL with a 50 per cent adjustment factor (i.e. UPL * 1.5). When the standard definition is used, as many 3,719 individuals and 567 households in Teknaf have become vulnerable. The figures for Ukhiya are 3,762 and 685, respectively. Under the extended definition,
23
the estimated number of households is 893 in Teknaf only. However, the overall impact on vulnerability is reduced if it is measured using the population of the newly vulnerable. As Figure ES.14 shows, the degree of vulnerability has intensified because household incomes have declined among those who were vulnerable before the influx but their vulnerability status is unchanged. Figure ES.14. Number of poor and vulnerable households in Teknaf and Ukhiya 15,000
11176
12129
10,000 4657
5,000 0
6065 1348
Poor householdsV
ulnerable households Teknaf
1154
Newly poor householdsN
597
685
ewly vulnerable households
Ukhiya
Source: UNDP household survey 2018.
Mesoeconomic impacts
Here, we look at socio-economic impacts on various sectors, related mainly to livelihoods. Impacts on land and agricultural production: According to an estimate from the Department of Agriculture Extension (DoAE), between August 2017 and March 2018, at least 100 ha of crop land in the Teknaf/Ukhiya peninsula was damaged by refugee activities, in addition to 76 ha of arable land that has been occupied by refugee settlements and humanitarian agencies. Around 5,000 acres of land have been rendered useless because of sandy soil flowing down from the mountain slopes, which are being used for refugee housing purposes. Grazing lands have been destroyed. In some places near the Myanmar borders there is a de facto ban on cultivation. During FGDs in Bandarban district, local people suggested no farming activities could be undertaken on several hundred acres. Owners of these lands were reportedly not receiving any compensation for lost income. At least 100 ha of crop land in Teknaf/Ukhiya has been damaged by refugee activities; 76 ha of arable land has been occupied by refugee settlements and humanitarian agencies. Farmers in Teknaf have always faced a lack of freshwater for agricultural production. However, a 2018 report by the Energy and Environment Technical Working Group of ISCG shows faecal contamination is now present in more than fourth fifths of sources. According to DoAE estimates, 93 ha of arable land around camps cannot be cultivated because of human waste contamination and pollution. An additional 380 ha cannot be cultivated because of lack of water for irrigation. Additional demand by refugees has resulted in more costly vegetables, which are largely supplied from outside Teknaf and Ukhiya. While higher prices affect local residents, traders and producers benefit. On the other hand, local producers and sellers face erosion in profit margins as a result of increased transportation costs and depressed prices of products leaking out of camps to be sold. 24
Impacts on fishing and related activities: About 28 per cent of total employment in Cox’s Bazar comes from fishing and related activities. In Teknaf, fishing employs nearly one in three persons (BBS, 2018). Since the crisis in August 2017, a ban has been in place on fishing in the Naf River, for security and border control reasons. This prohibition has placed significant pressure on an estimated 30,000–35,000 fishers and their families.6 Many fishers have been compelled to work as wage labourers, but the surge of refugee workers has led to lower job availability and lower daily wages. GoB officials and FGD participants in Teknaf suggested the fishing communities of the Naf River were likely to be among the groups most affected by the refugee crisis. The fishing communities of the Naf River are likely to be among the groups most affected by the refugee crisis. Impacts on the environment: Environmental damage is among the worst effects of the refugee influx. The refugees were first settled on 6,000 acres of government land that was characterized by forests and hills. Forests had to be cleared and hills levelled to make room for temporary housing. According to the Cox’s Bazar Forest Department, the refugee influx has destroyed about 4,818 acres of forest reserves worth US$55 million.7Those who earn a living from forest resources have in many cases been deprived of their livelihood. Meanwhile, every day, around 750,000 kg of timber, vegetation and roots are collected from the reserved forest as cooking fuel. This is equivalent to the surface of four football fields (Martin, 2017). Every day, around 750,000 kg of timber, vegetation and roots are collected from the reserved forest as cooking fuel. This is equivalent to the surface of four football fields. The camp area has already encroached on the natural habitat of Asian elephants, which poses risks for both refugees and elephants. The reserved forest areas are also home to 1,156 wildlife species, including mammals, fish, amphibians, reptiles and birds, among which 65 are identified as critically endangered, 94 as endangered and 56 as vulnerable. Deforestation also increases the risk of landslides, raises the threat of flash floods and intensifies the likelihood of damage from cyclones.
6 Interview with Teknaf Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO). 7 If we incorporate 695 acres occupied by Rohingya refugees in earlier crises, the total of permanently damaged forest is 5,513 acres (interview with Cox’s Bazar Sadar Forest Officer).
25
Macroeconomic impacts
From a macroeconomic perspective, we attempt to capture the links between the host and the refugee economies through various transmission channels and to obtain a measure of the overall impact on the economy. The camps provide additional economic activities that interact with the immediate local host economy, and through it with the economy of the region as a whole.8 Teknaf and Ukhiya constitute the local or immediate host economy and Cox’s Bazar the regional host. Using the Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation methodology (Taylor, 2013), we produce three simulations. Note that these come with a number of caveats, related mainly to obtaining data and over-estimating of aid/under-estimating forest losses. SIM 1 captures the impact of foreign aid provided to the Rohingya households/community. Ideally, we should consider only that portion of aid that is used to induce activities in the host community economy. As expected, the inflow of aid to Rohingya households means positive impacts are found for both the immediate and the regional host communities. With the assumption that aid money for refugees is going into the local economy, every US$1 of assistance leads to expanded host economy activities by US$2.70. SIM 2 considers the aid impact after adding the cost of deforestation. The estimated market value of the loss of forest resources is US$45 million at 2017 prices. This does not include other consequences, such as loss of opportunity for a livelihood or impacts on wildlife. Under this simulation, when the negative impact of the loss of forest resources is considered together with SIM 1, the outcome is negative for the immediate host community. There is hardly any change in the impact for Cox’s Bazar from the scenario under SIM 1.
8
26
This is because refugee populations are confined to their camps because of restrictions on their mobility.
In SIM 3, another immediate adverse impact—the depletion of the groundwater specific to the host community—is considered along with the scenario in SIM 2. A conservative estimate of the depleted water level of US$14 million is appropriate.9 Under this simulation we see a simulated cost to the immediate host community. Again, the impact on Cox’s Bazar does not change significantly. When the costs associated with the loss of forest and water resources are considered, the economy wide impact of US$1 of aid to refugees is reduced from US$2.70 to US$2.10 The simulation outcomes suggest that deleterious impacts are more localized than the aid impact. Cox’s Bazar and the rest of Bangladesh may be generating static gains in the short run. The losers are the immediate host community. Impact outlook in a situation of repatriation of Rohingya refugees Any potential medium- to long-term implications are sensitive to the length of stay of the Rohingya. Repatriation is an important issue for the host community, but there is widespread recognition of the need to ensure a safe and dignified return for the refugees. Under current conditions, full repatriation appears to be a distant possibility at best. Three alternative repatriation scenarios are under consideration: 1) a pessimistic scenario that would repatriate only 100 refugees per day for 20 days each month (24,000 a year); 2) a realistic scenario to repatriate 300 refugees per day for 25 days a month (90,000 a year); and 3) an optimistic repatriation scenario, with 600 Rohingya repatriated each day for 30 days a month (216,000 per year).
9 10
This estimate is based on the opportunity cost of providing an equivalent amount of water through rainwater collection. It should be emphasized again that cost estimates owing to loss of forest and water resources are very conservative.
27
Assuming an unchanged refugee population, even under the optimistic scenario full repatriation would require five years. Under a pessimistic scenario, it would take as long as 13 years. With further analysis, if a 3 per cent yearly population growth rate is added, complete repatriation increases by an additional two to five years. Many other medium- to long-term sector-specific requirements and consequences are also sensitive to the repatriation rate. For example, if the refugees are not provided with alternative cooking fuels, about 400,000 tonnes of timber will be required for next year alone (July 2018–June 2019). It can therefore be estimated that, between the optimistic and the realistic repatriation scenarios, forest depletion will be in the range of 1.2–2.8 million tonnes of timber by the end of 2023. The deforestation problem could be addressed by providing liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to the Rohingya refugees during their stay. The cost of such an intervention is estimated at US$75.3– 270 million under alternative assumptions. Meanwhile, around 5.6 billion litres of water will be required just for the next year alone. Between the optimistic and the realistic repatriation scenarios, the water requirement is estimated to range between 16 and 26 billion litres by the end of 2023. Estimated forest depletion will be in the range of 1.2–2.8 million tonnes of timber by the end of 2023. The water requirement is estimated to range between 16 and 26 billion litres. Considering only the refugee population, the cost of food, shelter, education and other basic needs, according to the estimates, would be a minimum of US$1,219 per refugee per year. This translates to a total requirement of US$3.2 billion (in the case of the most optimistic scenario) to US$11.6 billion (for the pessimistic repatriation scenario) over the period of the Rohingya stay. With a protracted refugee crisis, the challenge of sustaining donors’ interest will become more difficult. Figure ES.15. Duration of stay and cost for the refugee crisis (US$ million) 1,200 1,000
US$ million
800 600 400 200 0
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Source: UNDP estimates.
28
Impacts on public service and public goods delivery Public service delivery in Teknaf and Ukhiya, designed for a quarter of million people, now has to cope with an extra million people. Services are all being stretched far beyond their capacity, leading to tensions between the refugee and host communities, most of whom are also poor and vulnerable. Development and expenditure context in Cox’s Bazar, pre-influx Government expenditure per capita (circa 2008–2010) in Cox’s Bazar met the average in terms of development expenditure but ranked way below the average on non-development expenditure. As nondevelopmental expenditures dominate, Cox’s Bazar ranked very poorly in consolidated expenditures, at 19 per cent of Dhaka’s expenditure, 65 per cent of the national mean and 80 per cent of the median. Consequently, host communities in Cox’s Bazar were under-served to start with. Impacts of the influx on public service delivery Here, we look at the impact of the influx in terms of governance, solid waste management, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), housing, roads, business infrastructure, health and education. Impacts on governance: In the face of this massive crisis, governance institutions are becoming even limited in their effectiveness. Some local administration and sector officials spend 50 per cent or more of their time on Rohingya matters, resulting in delayed if not scaled down public service delivery. They also work on weekends without remuneration. Often, expenses incurred in attending to refugee-related matters are not reimbursed. Meanwhile, there has been a substantial rise in the population per officer. Inadequate coordination between various agencies cause further delays in implementing projects for both the refugees and the local community. Impacts on solid waste management and WASH: The huge influx of refugees has led to severe strain on the provision of public health engineering services including solid waste management. The situation is particularly worrisome around the Balukhali–Kutupalong mega-camp owing to faecal contamination in surface and groundwater reservoirs (ISCG, 2018b). This is then washed down by rainwater to then spread waterborne diseases to both refugees and host communities. Even before the influx, many places in Bandarban district and Teknaf and Ukhiya upazilas were recognized as areas with limited access to potable water (see Ahmed and Hassan, 2012). It is estimated that about 2.8 million litres of drinking water are required per day for the host community in Naikhongchhari (in Bandarban) and in Teknaf and Ukhiya (in Cox’s Bazar), along with another 43.5 million litres for other daily activities including irrigation and manufacturing. In the post-influx period, refugees are demanding an additional 13.8 million litres per day (including 3.4 million litres for drinking water).11This massively increased daily demand for fresh water, together with the severe water contamination levels in the affected areas, has deepened the water crisis. In the post-influx period, refugees are demanding an additional 13.8 million litres per day (including 3.4 million litres for drinking water).
11
15 litres per day per person of water consumption is assumed under an emergency situation or humanitarian crisis.
29
To supply water to the refugees, an estimated 5,731 tube wells were installed between August and December 2017, of which about 21 per cent had become non-functional by the end of January 2018 (ISCG, 2018a). In fact, the excessive dependence on ground water is lowering the water levels in the area. The water levels around the camp areas are reported to have fallen between 5 m and 9 m. Irrigation wells are slowly drying up as the water table is falling as a result of watershed destruction and a significant reduction in the recharge of ground water reserves.12 Continued pressure on the aquifer may result in salt water intrusion, rendering it unusable for the district.
12
30
Discussion with DoAE.
Figure ES.16. Falling water tables in Ukhiya and Teknaf (metres) Teknaf 0
Sabrang
Baharchhara
Ukhiya Nhilla
Whykong
Ratna Palong Haldia Palong Jalia Palong
Palong Khali
10
Metres
20 23
30 40 50
35
31 38
35
33
37
38 43
38 44
60
36
32 40
48 57
April 2017
April 2018
Source: Yearly updated data from DPHE, Cox’s Bazar. Impacts on housing: According to one study undertaken (WFP, 2017), half of the local population in Teknaf and Ukhiya are categorized as poor and very poor who do not own any land; the other half are categorized as middle- and high-wealth groups, owning on average just about an acre of land. Any poor households that own land have just enough to build a house, and rarely enough to grow some seasonal vegetables. Most people live in one-room houses with polythene roofing. In general, the local people live in housing that is in very poor condition and is vulnerable to natural factors such as strong winds, heavy monsoon downpours and flooding. Land scarcity has also contributed to overcrowding—which has worsened with the arrival of the refugees. Meanwhile, some Rohingya refugee camps are built on cultivable lands, further reducing the availability of land for cultivation and housing. Impacts on roads: Movement of a very large number of Rohingya and aid workers, public officials, international visitors and humanitarian relief vehicles is seriously degrading existing roads, including link roads. During the primary stage of the influx, refugees took shelter on roads, dams and bridges, which led to substantial damage. Construction of and use of transit camps and the subsequent abandonment of these have left behind a huge trail of infrastructural damage and environmental degradation. These sites now also include damaged schools and schoolyards and landslide-prone hills. Increased traffic congestion on the roads has raised access and safety concerns. Impacts on business infrastructure: Power cuts have become more frequent, disrupting daily life and adding further to the cost of running a business. Transport difficulties have also caused disruptions in the supply chain to local markets. Tourism, a major industry in Cox’s Bazar, has shown a declining trend 31
because of the various security and other restrictions now imposed along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border, as well as worsening infrastructural deficiencies. Impacts on health services: Teknaf and Ukhiya health complexes have seen an increase in consultations and admission. Lack of sanitation, malnutrition and cabins that are more and more crowded are increasing disease outbreaks. Health complexes and district hospitals have become increasingly geared towards attending to the emergency needs of the refugees. As a result, local communities are not receiving the same level of service as the refugees. The issue has become more complicated as refugees receive medication free but locals have to pay for the same. Impacts on education services: Since the influx, students from the local community are dropping out of school or skipping classes to help their families with income-generating activities, such as selling goods at refugee settlements. Parents are restricting girls from going to school because of concerns related to protection. Also, serious road hazards make travelling to and from school very dangerous. Many school buildings and playgrounds were used as refugee transit camps, leading to damage and several months of disruption. Even after the relocation of refugees, the repair and renovation work did not take place promptly. A large number of students and teachers have found well-paying jobs with international agencies and NGOs, as local facilitators and translators. High absenteeism is now a major issue.
Impacts on social safety nets in host communities Bangladesh’s social protection system and impacts of the influx on this Bangladesh’s social protection system comprises a large number of programmes managed by a large number of agencies. One of the key proposals of the NSSS is to consolidate these into seven core lifecycle schemes. The budget is low: key government plans have called to scale it up to around 2.5–3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Transfers constitute only 31 per cent of the needs of a poor or vulnerable person—inadequate to have an impact on their poverty situation. Coverage in all divisions except Khulna is less than the poverty rate. However, extended beneficiary coverage; higher allocations to the social safety net budget; and an increased average transfer amount during the post-Rohingya period mean the Rohingya crisis has not exerted any deleterious impact on the social safety net system in Bangladesh. This is expected, given that the hosting of Rohingya refugees is being covered using international aid. Cox’s Bazar district’s social protection system and impacts of the influx on this The social protection system in Cox’s Bazar district is implemented by DSS, under the Ministry of Social Welfare, and the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (MOWCA). DSS has been implementing eight schemes and MOWCA three (focusing primarily on women). Coverage of the poor population in the district as a whole is low. In Ukhiya, only 20.3 per cent of the poor are covered, and the figure is even lower for the Teknaf poor, at only 14.6 per cent. Coverage of social protection schemes should have been expanded in Teknaf and Ukhiya even under a normal situation. In principle, beneficiary coverage should be around 30–35 per cent of the total population. The UNDP survey found that beneficiary coverage in Cox’s Bazar district was around 23 per cent. This is significantly higher than the rate found in the social protection administrative data. What explains such 32
a large gap between our results and the administrative data rate? A closer review reveals that the higher coverage in our survey data owes to our inclusion of stipend schemes implemented by the Ministry of Education. Stipend schemes alone account for about 10 per cent. Figure ES.17. Beneficiary coverage of social protection schemes in Cox’s Bazar in past 12 months (% of all surveyed)
23% Received transfers 77%
Did not receive transfers
Source: UNDP household survey 2018. More beneficiaries have been included in the Cox’s Bazar social protection system post-Rohingya influx, with growth of 12.6 per cent between FY2018 and FY2017. Similar positive growth is seen in the disbursed amount. Growth rates in beneficiary coverage and fund disbursement in Ukhiya during the post-Rohingya period are, respectively, 15.7 per cent and 20.3 per cent. The corresponding growth rates in Teknaf are 15.9 per cent and 19.0 per cent. On the basis of these positive developments, it may be safely concluded that the Rohingya crisis has not affected social safety net programmes in the host community.
33
Impacts on social cohesion
There are several factors that caused to build up tensions between the host communities and refugees. In Teknaf and Ukhiya, the refugees now outnumber the local population by three times. The refugee influx has created a number of challenges, spread over a number of fronts. Many stress factors already existed well before the refugee influx. The sudden arrival of such a huge number of refugees exacerbated a pre-existing crisis-ridden situation in Cox’s Bazar, where the margin of tolerance for stress was already undermined. The survey asked households about their perceptions on various issues related to the Rohingya refugee crisis. As many as two thirds of respondents in Cox’s Bazar thought they had been directly affected by the refugee influx, with the most affected areas again being Teknaf and Ukhiya. All of the Teknaf respondents surveyed and 80 per cent in Ukhiya said they had been directly affected. More than 70 per cent of respondents in Teknaf and 50 per cent in Ukhiya reported falling wages as the principal way in which they had been affected. Similarly, 70 per cent of Teknaf respondents and 50 per cent in Ukhiya mentioned security concerns. Some households in Cox’s Bazar Sadar said they had been affected through higher health costs. More than 60 per cent of Ukhiya respondents reported higher transportation costs in the aftermath of the Rohingya influx, while about 70 per cent of respondents in the same upazila thought road conditions were deteriorating. About 45 per cent of households in Teknaf and 62 per cent in Ukhiya reported higher traffic congestion. Teknaf and Ukhiya respondents also thought more time was required to obtain general services from their union parishad office.
34
Figure ES.18. Reasons households gave for having been affected, by upazila (% of households)
Transport costs increased
Low employability and low wages 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Health care facilities deteriorated
Security issues– mobbed/threatened by refugees
Chakaria Cox's Bazar Sadar Kutubdia Maheshkhali
Quality of public services deteriorated
Pekua Ramu Teknaf Ukhiya
Health care costs increased
Business affected
Source: UNDP household survey 2018. The host community almost universally has negative views of the Rohingya even though they are sympathetic to their plight: many see them as uneducated, coarse and potentially criminal (UNDP and UN Women, 2017). There is also rising anxiety among locals of being outnumbered. There is also a very strong perception in the local community that the moral standards of youth have declined, and people attribute this to increased interaction with foreign aid workers. It is also felt within the local community that youth are sacrificing their long-term career prospects for short-term financial gains by taking up employment with NGOs instead of continuing to attend school or college. Meanwhile, many host community households believe all assistance is being provided to the refugees and because of this their own problems are not receiving priority. Locals in Teknaf and Ukhiya indicated a feeling of being ignored by humanitarian organizations and feeling under constant threat owing to rising labour competition, deforestation, price increases and damage to physical and natural resources (ACAPS and NPM, 2018).
35
36
Health
WASH
Livelihoods
Sectors
• • •
• • • • •
•
• •
• • •
• •
•
• • • • •
• • • • • • •
Capacity enhancement of public hospitals Testing and diagnostic facilities Provision of medical supplies Surveillance for infectious diseases Vaccination campaigns Multi-purpose health centre, eye care hospital Reproductive health kits Ante-natal care support Awareness against HIV/AIDS
Central water testing facilities Comprehensive water resource mapping Solid waste collection and disposal WASH blocks at schools Latrines, water points and hygiene kits Faecal sludge management units Contingency water supply
Cash for work Cash for food and nutrition Technical support Heavy machinery for agriculture Seed and fertilizer distribution Micro-gardening kits Training farmers, capacity-building authorities Microcredit support Interest--free loans Skills development projects Job market-oriented training Enhancing resources and increasing capacities of poor households Graduation from ultra-poor
Broad interventions
17 partners, including MSF, WHO, UNHCR, BRAC, Ganasasthya Kendro, ACT alliance, CARE international and (from GOB) Office of the Civil Surgeon, MOHFW and IEDCR
7 organizations working with DPHE, including BRAC, Friends in Village Development Bangladesh, Oxfam GB, UNICEF and World Vision International
GOB partners are DoAE and Forest Department
14 humanitarian agencies and development partners, including FAO, WFP, IOM, UNPFA, Oxfam GB, Action Contre la Faim, BRAC and Mukti
Implementing partners
A broad overview of support to host communities
Capacity of public hospitals increased by 878 beds Cox’s Bazar Medical College laboratory and testing improved 8 tons of medical supplies provided Reproductive health kits given to 89,000 underprivileged women and adolescent girls • Multiple rounds of vaccination to prevent typhoid, cholera and diphtheria outbreaks • Special treatment and care facilities for diphtheria and tuberculosis Total: 1.3 million targeted beneficiaries
• • • •
• Central water testing facilities will benefit entire district • Water resource mapping will help 1.2 million from both communities • UNDP pilot solid waste collection projects • Latrine, water points and hygiene kits provided in Teknaf/Ukhiya • WASH blocks in seven schools • Faecal sludge management units in Palong Khali, Nhilla and Whykong Total: 290,293 direct beneficiaries in the host community from WASH sector initiatives
About 30,000 families in Teknaf and Ukhiya have received various types of livelihood support • ,083 people have received cash for work • 6,230 people have received monetary support for food and nutrition • 524 farmers have received technical group support • 25,000 families are to receive micro-gardening kits • 50 trainers have received preparation • 2,150 farmers have received skills development training • 4,200 families have received microcredit support • 30,000 households will receive interest free loans • 2,000 families are being supported through the initiative to graduate from ultra-poverty Total: 350,000 members of host communities and the budget requirement is US$35 million
•
Coverage
37
Education
Protection
Nutrition
Sectors
• • • • • • • • •
•
•
• • •
• • • •
• • • • •
•
•
• • •
• •
Educational support to host primary schools Improved infrastructure Library and computer support Distance learning Pre-primary education Informal primary education Education for disabled children Midday meal and school nutrition Teenage skill development Adolescent support groups
Child protection Child-friendly spaces Awareness on child marriage Training of teenagers Victim support centre for women and children Community dialogues on GBV Leadership training Training on rights Women’s help desk at police stations Women-friendly hospitals Dignity and hygiene kits Promotion of human rights for disabled Protection committees
Outpatient therapeutic care units Identifying and eradicating malnutrition Treatment for vitamin deficiency Ante-natal care Nutrient supplements to pregnant and lactating mothers Nutrition counselling under the Improved Maternal and Child Nutrition project Fortified biscuits
Broad interventions
9 organizations working for host communities, including UNICEF, Save the Children, BRAC, Friends in Village Development Bangladesh, Sida, UNHCR, MOPME and Directorate of Primary Education
7 partnering organizations, including UNICF, Save the Children, BRAC, Mukti and GOB DSS
7 organizations, including UNICEF, WFP, Ganasasthya Kendro and BRAC
Implementing partners
54,000 children benefited from child protection measures Psycho-social support to 26,321 children in child-friendly spaces 50 social workers and 71 community members trained on child protection 820 adults reached in dialogue on child exploitation and other risks 3 women help desks at police stations of Teknaf/Ukhiya 5 women-friendly hospitals in Teknaf/Ukhiya 800 persons trained on GBV 1,200 women trained on legal rights 625 administrative staff trained on protection 321 women receiving leadership training by BRAC 2,731 cases of GBV support to women and adolescent girls 50 community protection committees Total coverage of 64,103 host community members
• 30,400 students will receive support through December 2020 • Library and computer facilities enhanced in 6 schools • Classroom and infrastructure development in 6 schools • 15 distance learning centres • 3,697 children supported in 100 pre-primary schools • 50 informal primary education centres • 7 primary schools offer midday meal nutrition • 107 adolescent support groups created by BRAC Total: 115,000 direct beneficiaries within the host community
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
• 52 outpatient therapeutic care centres working to eradicate malnutrition • 20,841 children screened for acute malnutrition, 524 treated • Supplementary feeding for 623 lactating and pregnant women • Nutrition counselling for 7,123 mothers • Fortified biscuits to 137 primary schools in the district Total: Targeted beneficiaries: 68,500
Coverage
38
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• •
•
Radio shows to address host community problems Training of radio journalists on conflict reporting Capacity enhancement of Bangladesh Radio staff Road theatre shows to promote peace and cohesion Joint training on emergency preparedness Social cohesion and conflict resolution through community engagement Awareness against extremism
Rebuilding roads, bridges, footpaths Drainage system, dredging canals Logistics and human resources support to local government Capacity enhancement of disaster risk management authorities Community groups, warning systems and disaster management committees Assessment and repair of public buildings and cyclone shelters Identification of impact on host community by camp activities
Broad interventions
BBC Media Action, Bangladesh Betar, Radio Naf, Oxfam GB, COAST, Mukti, YPSA, Jago Nari foundation, and local government
RRRC, IOM, UNHCR, UNDP and UNPFA with LGED
Implementing partners
• •
• • •
• •
•
• • •
• • • • • •
12 themed and 5 call-in radio shows on health, WASH and nutrition Promotion of educational themes through folk songs and other entertainments Special shows aimed at adolescent listeners 47 road shows on social cohesion, attended by 10,615 Community engagement against extremism, Torun Alo and OBIRODH youth forums against religious extremism Para-development committees to achieve conflict resolution Biweekly community dialogue, courtyard sessions in every ward to mitigate tension between communities
40 km roads, 10 bamboo footbridges and 6 footpaths in Teknaf and Ukhiya Repair of drainage system of Teknaf municipality 10 km of canal dredged at Kutupalong–Balukhali 20 public shelters repaired, 337 potential shelters reassessed Early warning system for disasters in 4 schools 18 ward disaster management committees together with four union disaster management committees Training of 615 Cyclone Preparedness Programme volunteers Technical and logistics support to UNO of Teknaf and Ukhiya Capacity enhancement of public authorities with logistic, human resources and training Assessment of health hazards to host communities owing to drainage outlets of camps
Coverage
Note: The interventions include both current on-going and completed initiatives. Source: Primary source of information is ISCG (2018c). However, important information was also obtained from ISCG (2018a, 2018d); ISCG and CCNF (2018); and BRAC (2018), as well as by the study team from the Cox’s Bazar DC Office, RRRC, Office of the Civil Surgeon, DoAE, Department of Women’s Affairs, DSS, DPHE and LGED.
Communication with communities
Disaster risk management/ site management
Sectors
Cost implications
So far, much of the cost of dealing with the influx has been met out of the international humanitarian aid being funnelled in under the JRP. While international humanitarian assistance poured in at the initial stage of the crisis, and still continues to arrive, such inflows will slowly taper off. Over the next two to three years this assistance will decline to 30 per cent, reaching 15 per cent of total needs. The RIVNA quotes the JRP and provides an estimate for humanitarian agencies to fulfil all needs from March to December 2018 of US$950.8 million. While the RIVNA has added an estimate of US$1.15 billion for another two years of Rohingya presence beyond 2018, the stipulation of a most optimistic scenario of repatriation is five years. Therefore, conservatively, an additional US$1.15 billion should be required for Rohingya management till 2023.
39
Table ES.2. Allocations by sector (US$) Sector
Cost breakdown
Cost
Host
Rohingya
Both/non-separable
Education
280.5
113.5
159.0
8.0
Social protection
259.6
70.7
188.8
-
Health
185.4
84.6
85.1
15.7
Shelter
130.9
-
130.9
-
Environment
91.2
22.2
57.1
11.9
Transport
82.2
-
40.4
41.8
WASH
48.3
13.2
34.6
0.5
Disaster risk management
36.9
3.3
21.8
11.8
Urban development
26.8
1.6
24.2
0.06
Social development
12.5
1.4
3.6
7.5
Total
1,154.3
310.5
746.5
97.2
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2018). Interventions such as food assistance, health, education and shelter improvement are assumed to transition gradually into a more sustainable model. The JRP does not cover capital investment for infrastructure, human resource capacity enhancement and technical assistance activities. Current and planned public development projects in Cox’s Bazar Some major public projects are underway in Cox’s Bazar, which, in the long term, may complement many interventions specified in the JRP. These projects have the potential to generate additional livelihood opportunities, improved transportation systems and enhanced trade and investment links within the economy and the rest of the world. Although these programmes are not driven by the refugee influx, their timely and effective completion could be an important contribution here.
Suggested programming for host communities Learning from current programming To prepare a comprehensive strategy for the host community, we need to learn from continuing and completed interventions to understand their depth, coverage and effectiveness. Some may need greater coverage; others may benefit from more efficiently designed implementation. Targeting is also important, especially when universal coverage cannot be assured. Most of the programmes addressed through the JRP come with a limited timeline, and the current ones are planned to the end of 2018, subject to availability of funding. It would thus be wise now to consider a medium-term framework to help host communities (as well as refugees). Coordination and collaboration will need to be established to upgrade functioning interventions and to improve project designs by drawing on the experiences of existing operations. Discussions on proposed interventions cover, among other things, targeting and coverage and approximate costs. An initial framework for monitoring and evaluation is included in the main report.
40
A closer look at current programmes also suggests a lack of support for affected communities in Bandarban. It would be appropriate to bring Bandarban households within any support programmes. We briefly propose some options here. Greater details on these and on the preliminary costing of individual interventions (where possible) are included in the main report. Widening livelihood support programmes for the host community • Through cash for work (CFW), host community day can be hired for projects such as infrastructure development, plantations and environmental rehabilitation and promotion, which can also have a lasting positive impact on the greater community. As such programmes are highly resourceintensive, and it can be difficult to manage and sustain them, a more pragmatic option could be to offer cash support, to contribute towards compensating for the loss of income owing to declining market wage rates. A combination of CFW and cash compensation schemes would be ideal but with the provison that no worker can benefit from both simultaneously. •
Livelihood support needs to be extended to fishers, since most are from very poor households and do not have adequate coping mechanisms. As an immediate strategy, they could be given cash support and training to carry out deep sea fishing using modern equipment. This should be followed with financial assistance or credit facilities to support procurement of suitable boats and equipment. Training could also be provided on farming seaweed, as an alternative livelihood support mechanism, particularly for lean seasons. This work could be integrated into World Bank-supported GOB plans to implement a major programme on the expansion of coastal and marine fisheries for sustainable economic development (World Bank, 2017).
Empowering women through improved livelihood opportunities in refugee-affected areas
41
One option would be to enhance current programmes that enrol women using their particular targeting criteria and, if necessary, upgrade the modules and introduce new courses. Initially, this could target women who are seeking jobs and self-employment opportunities and who are likely to retain the skills they have acquired. We could also consider expansion of UNDP’s Strengthening Women’s Ability for Productive New Opportunities, which is a social transfer that seeks to empower ultra-poor women by improving their livelihood abilities, socioeconomic engagement and resilience. Strengthening local agricultural production • IOM and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) have already targeted 25,000 host community households to receive micro-gardening kits. Households receive high-yield seeds of low-maintenance crops, plus fertilizers and other basic equipment. Training on micro-gardening precedes distribution. Coverage of this could be extended to all poor households. •
Ektee Bari Ektee Khamar (One Home One Farm) is a GOB initiative to eradicate poverty through family farming and generating employment for the poor and underprivileged. Extending coverage could increase livestock and milk production and contribute to the empowerment of women, who usually play a bigger role in raising livestock. Members of Village Development Organizations receive training on agriculture, nurseries, fisheries, poultry and livestock and then train other members, who then receive funds for individual and group farming.
•
Irrigation remains a significant issue. Many canals need to be dredged, and new ones constructed. Low-lift pumps can be distributed to farmers, through the current DoAE mechanism of supporting farmer groups. Another alternative is Farmer Field Schools. Farmers are introduced to new or highyielding breeds, innovative techniques, modern machinery and practical solutions to identified needs. They can also compare the outcome of different methods at demo shows.
Providing informed analysis through primary data collection It is important to monitor developments, using credible data and analysis, to ensureinterventions remain appropriate. Many agencies are undertaking studies that use both quantitative and qualitative techniques, but consistent analysis over time that utilizes comparable data will remain a major challenge. One option is to have one focal point collect specific information on a regular basis by using the same or comparable methodologies for groups with similar interests (e.g. women, female-headed households, wage workers). A data panel developed through repeated surveys of a substantial sample of households (say, 10,000) drawn from both host communities and refugees could be one means to monitor the situation and perform policy analysis. The households selected can be rotated to address any sampling errors made at the initial stage. Such surveys should include market price data and capture host communities’ perceptions on basic needs.
42
Civil administration
• (Priority) If budgetary allocations are unavailable, funding from the JRP/RIVNA must be allocated to cover the costs of logistics and special compensation for DC Office staff. The Office of the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) Ukhiya needs more staff and logistics as it is at the forefront of the refugee rehabilitation challenge. UNO Teknaf comes next in order of priority. Assistant UNOs should be appointed to look after the extra demand for services. Even the DC Office needs a UNO-level official. Such capacity supplementation, with logistics and financial resources, will be needed in sector offices too. Salaries and logistics will add about 20 per cent to current expenditures—funds that could be raised from grants or concessional loans from multilateral institutions, or provided through the JRP or similar sources.
Governance
43
• (Priority) An effective integrated and singularly focused mechanism needs to be established to serve as a one-stop public service delivery point in each camp. An integrated approach to service delivery for all refugees would enable them to settle better with less stress. Also, agencies will be able to better manage their workload. • (Priority) Local government representatives are to be consulted on a regular basis on community needs and concerns. They need to be part of all decision-making bodies on current and future policies and programmes in the context of the on-going crisis. • (Priority) The design and implementation of programmes must be sustainable. Implementing organizations need to be sufficiently resourced and able to maintain appropriate staffing levels and to invest in training and professional development, with a reasonable workload. • (Priority) Service providers need to factor in issues relating to suffering, trauma and other long-term implications for refugees settling in the local community, as well as for host communities. Flexible programmes that can be tailored to individual needs are of utmost importance. • (Priority) Maintenance of law and order within and outside the camps is an absolute priority. There is an immediate need to substantially increase the number of police camps inside the refugee camps, as well as in neighbouring upazilas. •
The current Rohingya refugee settlement policy is based on a “temporary camp solution” pending the final outcome on repatriation. The focus of the public service delivery system needs to be simplified to focus holistically on those seeking support/protection.
•
GoB needs to develop and adopt a comprehensive refugee policy, preferably in line with the International Refugee Convention of 1951. One positive outcome of such a policy will be that the relevant state apparatus will be aware of needs, including those related to public service delivery, and also will be prepared to deal with crisis as and when it occurs.
•
The time is now ripe to develop a “solidarity compact” in favour of Bangladesh, to encourage the international community to share the burden in sustaining interventions.
•
A refugee advocacy group could be set up to represent views and interests, monitorcompliance, receive complaints and respond to individual concerns. It must include refugee representatives.
•
Meanwhile, instead of keeping the refugees wholly confined in the camps, efforts could be made to see how best to use these human resources until their repatriation, both to improve their own welfare and to contribute to the well-being of the host community.
Infrastructure • (Priority) The current Cox’s Bazar Development Plan has been rendered ineffectual in light of the influx and its impact on the availability of public goods and services. A revamped, upgraded and more comprehensive development plan is needed to address the new and evolving scenario, with at least a 50 per cent increase in the infrastructure investment budget. GOB resources will have to be adequately supplemented with resources from the JRP/RIVNA or future programmes. •
The Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) has provided a comprehensive proposal to build additional infrastructure in Cox’s Bazar that will address the needs of both communities. This includes construction of roads, bridges and culverts, schools, cyclone shelters and market sheds and expansion of market areas. LGED is seeking funds for this under special grants from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
•
The influx has also greatly affected Naikhongchhari and Ghumdum unions of Bandarban district,
44
two sites already considered very remote and dilapidated. Many kilometres of brick and paved roads have been severely affected and need immediate repair, as do roads and bridges. Ensuring sustainability is an important issue. Heavy rainfall is a natural characteristic here, so we recommend turning these brick and mud paths into paved asphalt roads.
Environment
• (Priority) Both refugees and the host community need the means to acquire fuel alternatives. Several options are available. Some pilot initiatives, such as producing biogas from faecal treatment, are also underway. The use of LPG for cooking is one option. This has safety risks. A strategy of combining supervised community kitchens using LPG, expanded use of solar stoves, awareness-building campaigns on efficient fuel utilization, safe food storage, improved stoves and alternative fuel access could be a practical and safer option. •
Reforestation programmes need to be revitalized. Such projects should cover at least the 5,530 acres of forest already destroyed, along with support to host community planters who have suffered damage to private or leased forest lands. At the initial stage, this should identify areas for intervention and the suitable plantings. Damaged and endangered plant species should also be identified. At the second stage, transplanting should commence in degraded and deforested hilly areas using the current year’s seedlings, followed by regular nurturing and monitoring. An expansion of the World Bank Sustainable Forests and Livelihood programme and/or collaboration with other development partners would be very timely here.
Improving access to safe drinking water A viable and sustainable solution to the fresh water availability crisis could involve harvesting rainwater for the target population of host community households. This can be replicated with effective utilization of prior experience under similar conditions. In Satkhira and Bagerhat, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provided a grant of US$33 million to provide a community-based rainwater harvesting system that is being implemented by UNDP. The programme will provide clean drinking water to 130,000 people in that locality (Reuters, 2017). Thus, a potential source of funding could be the Green Climate Fund of UNFCCC, since Teknaf and Ukhiya are reported to be among the areas most vulnerable to climate change (World Bank, 2018).
45
Sanitation and waste management
• (Priority) In Teknaf and Ukhiya, although 2,700 latrines have been provided to host community households, there is significant room to provide additional support (ISCG, 2018e). Potentially 19,700 households require such latrines for complete coverage. If pit latrines are also brought under this future intervention, the corresponding number rises to 68,950 households. Bandarban district has very low access to sanitary latrines. About 2,000 households in the refugee-affected unions of Naikhongchhari and Ghumdum can also be provided with this support. • (Priority) Faecal sludge management for host community populations alone will not be effective, since the main source of water contamination is the refugees. The JRP intends to establish 10–12 faecal sludge management facilities in the area. All households in Teknaf and Ukhiya should be brought under this programme. A detailed assessment of faecal sludge management should be undertaken to identify the potential scope for any extended coverage. The framework for implementation should be based on the sustainable sanitation value chain, including proper containment, emptying (cleansing of sludge), transportation, treatment and safe disposal. • (Priority) Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) officials suggested various ways of dealing with the sludge. Once faecal matter is collected from latrines using vacuum pumps, it is transported in specialized vehicles to a sludge management site. There it is kept in a four-layer drying bed (sand, gravel, plastic, stones) for two weeks. Then it is transferred to a maturation pond for further decomposition. The decomposed matter can be mixed with agricultural waste residue and used as compost fertilizer, or for biogas and cooking fuel (Jahan, 2018). • (Priority) GoB will need to put in place a long-term sustainable solution through establishment of a solid waste management system for Cox’s Bazar. This will require a regional sanitary landfill as well as recycling facilities for recyclable solid waste. Solid waste management programmes will also generate employment for both the refugees and the local population and will stimulate the local economy and entrepreneurship. Under an integrated framework, a combined intervention can be undertaken 46
for solid waste management along with faecal sludge management. Ideally, all households in Teknaf and Ukhiya should be brought under the coverage of this effort.
Reviving educational activities in the aftermath of the refugee crisis
•
Limited measures have been undertaken to repair educational institutions, but this could be an opportunity for comprehensive renovation and modernization of schools to make the learning environment more attractive and effective for students. Currently, GoB is trying to establish information and communications technology-based interactive educational systems in public schools. A central monitoring hub can help in evaluating important indicators like attendance, participation and student performance. Welltargeted support from donors and development partners would supplement GOB’s work here.
•
In school feeding, one World Food Programme (WFP) initiative provides a 75 mg biscuit packet each day to every child in primary school, but to defeat malnutrition and make schools attractive there is a need to develop daily meal programmes. Currently, students from 17 primary schools in Cox’s Bazar district have access to the GOB midday meal initiative. Only one of these schools is in Ukhiya; none is in Teknaf. We recommend starting the programme in all 145 primary schools in Teknaf, Ukhiya and Ghumdum. Under a programme run by Hope Worldwide Bangladesh, students receive midday meals that include 200 g of khichuri or rice five days a week, as well as 120 g of chicken, 110 g of fish or an egg every other day. It may be possible to replicate this.
Community cohesion, confidence-building and conflict resolution approaches • Suggested measures here include mapping the tensions and drivers of conflict; helping GOB and the international community establish a performing early warning system; strengthening social cohesion and implementing confidence-building initiatives; and designing and implementing a comprehensive conflict prevention roadmap. In this context, issues relate to exclusion, discrimination and rights violations, in particular for women and girls. Addressing all these issues will require working towards a conflictsensitive short- and medium-term response. 47
•
One of the most significant challenges to reaching out to the Rohingya community is the language barrier. The high illiteracy rate among the refugee population means the only possible means of communicating with them is by word of mouth. Audio and video media could be helpful in building trust between the host and refugee communities. One option could involve providing radios to refugees, to help deal with rumours in order to ease tensions.
•
Community policing could help address the security concerns of the host community, particularly as local law enforcement agencies are overstretched. This would also provide employment opportunities for both communities.
Developing a risk management system UNDP has already put in place a Disaster Risk Management Project to be completed in two phases. Phase I will focus on immediate preparedness for the forthcoming cyclone and current monsoon season. Phase II is designed to contribute to the permanent establishment of local disaster management capacities throughout Cox’s Bazar district. Suggested social safety net schemes Using different methods to assess the cost to host communities, we suggest various social protection schemes for the host communities.
48
Suggested social safety net schemes: We also suggest various social protection schemes for host communities. These are as follows (the details are in the main report): Scheme 1: UT natural resource depletion scheme. The estimated loss for the host community as a result of the destruction of forestry resources and depletion of ground water is Tk. 7,732 million. This translates into losses of Tk. 61,572 per household and Tk. 13,683 per capita for the immediate host community (Teknaf and Ukhiya). Thus, a transfer amount should be set at Tk. 82,910 per household and Tk. 14,097 per capita. Coverage should be universal, with all households in Teknaf and Ukhiya eligible. Scheme 2: UT family income support scheme (variants for new poor, all poor and all households). We found few new poor households post-crisis in Teknaf and Ukhiya— respectively, 1,348 and 1,154. Selecting these households accurately from among the large number of similar vulnerable households is challenging. Moreover, selection will inevitably be erroneous, leading to serious discontent among local residents. The second-best approach would be to cover all poor households in Teknaf and Ukhiya—10,770 for Teknaf and 12,356 for Ukhiya. The best approach is to cover all households in Teknaf (49,360) and Ukhiya (43,896) following the universal approach. Three variants may thus be considered, based on beneficiary coverage. In the first variant, coverage is lowest and includes only the identified new poor households. The main merit of this variant is the low resource need. However, beneficiary selection is very difficult. In the third variant, inclusion of all households is proposed. The main demerit of this variant is the large resource need, but beneficiary selection is almost perfect. The second variant can be viewed as a compromise. Scheme 3: Teknaf fishers income support scheme. The average monthly income of a fisher before the Rohingya crisis has been estimated at Tk. 8,000 per month. Although the monthly transfer amount may be set at Tk. 8,000 per month, this may discourage them from finding alternative work or fishing in other water bodies. Thus, the monthly transfer amount may be set at Tk. 4,000 (i.e. 50 per cent below their pre-crisis income but above the amount of estimated poverty line of Tk. 1,928). A support package composed of a cash transfer and skills development may also be designed for these fishers. Expansion of existing schemes. Our review of the social protection system of Cox’s Bazar district suggests very low beneficiary coverage—at around 6 per cent of the district population. Thus, it may be logical to expand beneficiary coverage at least to the level of national coverage (i.e. 34 per cent of Cox’s Bazar population). The average monthly transfer amount per person at the national level is Tk. 596. This level of transfer amount would be retained. The benefits of such schemes include: • Wider coverage of the vulnerable population in Cox’s Bazar district; • Exclusion of genuine beneficiaries reduced; • Inclusion of ineligible beneficiaries lowered; • Increased effective demand, leading to further growth of the local economy; • A reduction in poverty and inequality.
Proposed employment schemes for Rohingya refugees: Implementation of employment schemes for the Rohingya adult population is likely to enhance their welfare as well as lessen supply pressure on the local labour market by the unskilled daily labourers. We consider four scenarios based on coverage and number of employment days. Full details are in the main report.
49
Scenario 1: CFW covering all the adult Rohingya population providing 22 work days in a month with a Tk. 200 per day wage Scenario 2: Covering 50 per cent of the adult Rohingya population (providing 22 work days in a month with a Tk. 200 per day wage Scenario 3: Covering all the adult Rohingya population providing 12 work days in a month with a Tk. 200 per day wage Scenario 4: Covering 50 per cent of the adult Rohingya population providing 12 work days in a month with a Tk. 200 per day wage Capacity assessment Local-level implementation is the responsibility of social services officers at upazila level. Although we were not able to obtain full staffing records to determine the amount of personnel resources devoted to programmes, it is clear these are relatively small. Moreover, in practice many of these posts remain vacant. Human resources are thus very limited and widely stretched. Social services officers are not devoted solely to these programmes but rather have a wide range of responsibilities both within the department and for other ministries and departments. The estimated beneficiary/staff ratio is more than 2,000 for Teknaf and slightly less than 2,000 for Ukhiya. These high ratios tend to suggest low monitoring and inadequate client support. Moreover, with only one motorcycle available, client support to remote areas seems impossible. Thus, capacity in Teknaf and Ukhiya needs vast improvement. It is proposed that staff strength in Teknaf and Ukhiya be increased to 20. The number of motorcycles should be increased to five for Teknaf and Ukhiya. Teknaf and Ukhiya social services offices should also be equipped with six more computers (three each) and two heavyduty printers (one each). Conclusion The Rohingya influx has placed on the host communities an extraordinary burden, compounded by the fact that these areas were already confronted with formidable challenges associated with relatively weak socio-economic development. Impacts have been particularly related to a fall in daily wages for labourers and extremely adverse impacts on public services and the environment. While emergency support was quick to arrive, long-term continual support is essential, particularly in view of the uncertain length of stay of the Rohingya refugees. Given today’s realities, it is now the wisest course to consider a medium-term framework, as repatriation is likely to take several years. More in-depth and sustained interventions will be needed, in particular in Bandarban district, which is also heavily affected by the influx but does not seem to be receiving as much support as Cox’s Bazar district. It is worthwhile to emphasize the following issues: • The socio-economic situation is evolving, thus continual monitoring is essential. In particular, price movements and changes in wages and their impact are critical issues for future assessment. •
The impact on wages is likely to increase as refugee participation in the labour market rises.
•
Studies undertaken in other countries show that cash assistance to refugees can create significantly
50
greater positive income spill-overs to host communities. This could be considered in this case. •
The heaviest toll of refugee inflows is on the environment. In some cases, these impacts present potential hazardous risks to health. This will require more in-depth assessment in the future.
•
Effective delivery of public services and expanded social protection schemes are absolutely vital, especially for the most affected areas in Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban districts.
The refugee crisis could in fact represent an opportunity to address the issues that have hampered economic development in Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban for many years. While confronting the adverse impacts noted in this study, concerted efforts can be undertaken to transform the two districts. In this way, it will be possible not only to address the negative impacts of the refugee influx but also to put the two districts on an upward development trajectory based on the situation pre-influx. This can only be positive—for both the host communities and the refugees.
References ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project) and NPM (Needs and Population Monitoring) (2018) “Rohingya Crisis: Host Communities Review”. Thematic Report. Geneva: ACAPS and IOM. Ahmed, R. and Hassan, S. (2012) “Hard-to-Reach Areas: Providing Water Supply and Sanitation Services to All”. Guidance Note. Washington, DC: WSP, World Bank. BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) (2015) Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2012–13. Dhaka: BBS. BBS (2017a) Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics—2017. Dhaka: BBS. BBS (2017b) Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016. Dhaka: BBS. BBS (2018) Labour Force Survey Bangladesh 2016-17. Dhaka: BBS. BRAC (2018) “BRAC’s Humanitarian Response in Cox’s Bazar”. Strategy for 2018. Dhaka: BRAC. EETWG (Energy and Environment Technical Working Group) (2018) “Environmental Activities Overview”. Dhaka: EETWG, ISCG. Huang, C., Ash, N., Skinner, M. and Gough, K. (2018) “The Rohingya Crisis: Bangladesh Deserves a WinWin Solidarity Compact”. Policy Insights, July: 30–33. IOM (International Organization for Migration) (2018) “Rohingya Refugee Crisis, IOM Appeal”. Dhaka: IOM. ISCG (Inter Sector Coordination Group) (2018a) “The Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis”. Cox’s Bazar: ISCG. ISCG (2018b) “Support to Bangladesh Host Communities in the Rohingya Refugee Response”. May. Cox’s Bazar: ISCG. ISCG (2018c) “Support to Bangladesh Host Communities and Institutes in the Joint Response Plan for the 51
Rohingya Refugee Crisis”. Cox’s Bazar: ISCG. ISCG (2018d) “4W (Who, What, Where, When) Round 25. Humanitarian Response in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh”. Cox’s Bazar: ISCG. ISCG (2018e) “WASH Sector Strategy for Rohingyas Influx: Cox’s Bazar”. March. Cox’s Bazar: ISCG. ISCG (Inter Sector Coordination Group) and CCNF (Cox’s Bazar CSO NGO Forum) (2018) “Activities of NNGO/LNGO in Cox’s Bazar”. Cox’s Bazar: ISCG. Jahan, H. (2018) “Managing Sanitation for the Rohingya Refugee”. Practical Action blog, 15 February. https://practicalaction.org/blog/news/campaigns/managing-the-sanitationchallengefor-rohingya-refugees/ (retrieved 7 November 2018). Martin, W. (2017) “Strategic Recommendations for Shelter Upgrade in Response to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. Findings and Results of the Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) on Bamboo and Timber Market Chains in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh”. Dhaka: Global Shelter Cluster, Shelter/NFI Sector and ECHO. Parvez, S. (2018) “Rice Imports Hit Two-Decade High”. Daily Star, 4 January. https://www.thedailystar.net/ business/economy/bangladesh-rice-imports-hit-twodecade-high-in-2017-18-fiscal-year-1514755 Rahman, M. (2017) “Retail Price of Coarse Rice Hits Tk 50”. Daily Observer, 18 September. http://www. observerbd.com/details.php?id=95445 Reuters (2017) “Bangladeshi Women to Receive Funding for Protection from Climate Change”. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-funding-climate/bangladeshi-women-toreceive-funding-forprotection-from-climate-change-idUSKBN1GH1O5 (retrieved 7 November 2018). Taylor, J.E. (2013) A Methodology for Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) of Cash Transfers: Methodological Guidelines for the From Protection to Production Project. Rome: FAO. UNDP and UN Women (2017) “Social Impact Assessment of the Rohingya Refugee Crisis into Bangladesh: Key Findings and Recommendations”. Dhaka: UNDP and UN Women. UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) (2018) “Supplementary Appeal, Myanmar Refugee Emergency in Bangladesh”. Dhaka: UNHCR. WFP (2017) “Market Assessment in Cox’s Bazar: Implications for Market-Based Interventions Targeted to Rohingya Refugees and Host Communities”. Dhaka: WFP and Bangladesh Food Security Sector. World Bank (2017). Bangladesh Sustainable Coastal and Marine Fisheries. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2018) “Rapid Impact, Vulnerability and Needs Assessment: Rohingya Crisis 2017-18”. Dhaka: GRDRR.
52
www.bd.undp.org
53